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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), inasmuch as this case was transferred to the Court
of Appeals from the Supreme Court. This appeal is from an Order Granting Motion
for Summary Judgment of the State of Utah and the Memorandum Decision Pursuant
to Rule 52(a) entered by the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah on February 8, 1990.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

If an injured party (Aundrae Higley via his estate inasmuch as he is a

minor) does not file a claim or commence an action against any third party for
compensation for injury sustained, but rather if the insurance company voluntarily
comes forward and offers Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) to the injured party
and his conservator; and further, if none of the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00)
was paid to the injured party as recovery of medical costs, in fact, the limit of
medical costs coverage under the insurance policy, i.e., Five Thousand Dollars
($5,000.00), was paid directly to medical care providers, whereas the Twenty
Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) was recovery for personal and emotional injury suffered
by the injured party, then in such a situation has the injured party "filed a claim" or
"commenced an action" against a third party "for recovery of medical costs" for the
injury to allow the State of Utah reimbursement for Medicaid assistance under Utah
Code Annotated, Section 26-19-7?.

(iv)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Aundrae Higley, a minor, was seriously injured in an accident and underwent
extensive medical treatment. The automobile involved in the accident was insured
by Farmers Insurance Group.1

The liability policy provided a Twenty Thousand

Dollars ($20,000.00) limit of liability for non-medical personal injury damages and
provided a Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) medical expense cap.
At a point later in time the Higleys applied for Medicaid assistance whereby
the State of Utah paid Fifty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Eighteen and 99/100
Dollars ($54,918.99) toward medical expenses.
Farmers paid the aforementioned Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) directly to
Aundrae's medical care providers and the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) was
paid to Aundrae via his estate. That settlement was approved by the Third District
Court.
Thereafter, the State of Utah petitioned the lower court pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 26-19-7, for reimbursement of the entire Twenty Thousand Dollars
($20,000.00) paid by Farmers,
The lower court entertained cross motions for summary judgment and after oral
argument granted the State's motion and entered an Order Granting Motion for
Summary Judgment of the State of Utah and a Memorandum Decision Pursuant to
Rule 52(a).

1

Hereinafter Farmers.
1

The estate of Aundrae Higley has herein appealed that decision of the lower
court. In accordance thereto the following statement of facts are relevant to the issues
presented for review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On April 30, 1985, Aundrae Higley,2 then twelve (12) years of age, was

seriously injured when the parked car on which he had been sitting pulled away
from the curb at a high rate of speed, causing Aundrae to fall and strike his head
on the pavement. (See Affidavit of Dennis J. Higley, record at 108)
2.

As a result of the accident, Aundrae underwent extensive medical

treatment, the cost of which exceeded Sixty Five Thousand Dollars ($65,000.00).
Aundrae twice underwent brain surgery and intensive therapy.

(See Affidavit of

Dennis J. Higley, record at 109)
3.

Aundrae sustained permanent brain damage and, at a minimum,

sustained a twenty five percent (25%) disability as a result of the injuries sustained
in the accident. (See Affidavit of Dennis J. Higley, record at 109)
4.

The automobile involved in the accident was insured by Farmers. (See

Affidavit of Dennis J. Higley, record at 109)
5.

The policy of liability insurance provided limits of coverage of Twenty

Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) for injuries to one person per occurrence and a Five
Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) coverage limit on medical payments. (See Affidavit of
Dennis J. Higley, record at 109)

2

Hereinafter Aundrae.
2

6.

While in the hospital Aundrae's father, Dennis Higley, was approached

by representatives of Farmers who informed him that the Five Thousand Dollars
($5,000.00) in medical benefits coverage would be paid to the medical care providers
and that Farmers had decided to pay the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) policy
limit to Aundrae to partially compensate him for the physical and emotional injuries
he suffered as a result of the accident. (See Affidavit of Dennis J. Higley, record at
109)
7.

Farmers offered Dennis Higley the aforementioned settlement on or

before May 31, 1985. (See Response of Estate of Aundrae Higley to State's Motion
for Summary Judgment, record at 164)
8.

The Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) policy limits on medical benefits

from Farmers was paid to the medical care providers. (See Affidavit of Dennis J.
Higley, record at 109)
9.

Dennis Higley applied for Medicaid assistance on or about June 10, 1985.

(See Motion for Summary Judgment, record at 148)
10.

Eligibility for Medicaid assistance was certified by the Department of

Social Services on or about June 20, 1985.

(See Motion for Summary Judgment,

record at 150)
11.

The State of Utah paid a total of Fifty Four Thousand Nine Hundred

Eighteen and 99/100 Dollars ($54,918.99) in Medicaid benefits for the medical services
and treatment rendered to Aundrae. (See Notice of Petition and Hearing, record at
80)

3

12.

Dennis Higley, without the assistance of legal counsel, petitioned the

lower court for appointment as conservator of the estate of Aundrae Higley,3 Aundrae
being a minor. (See Petition for Appointment of Conservator, Approval of Settlement
and Authority' to Invest Proceeds and Execute Release, record at 2 - 50)
13.

Dennis Higley was appointed conservator of the estate of Aundrae

Higley on or about October 30, 1985. (See Minute Entry Dated Oct. 30, 1985, record
at 52) A formal order was entered by the lower court on or about November 22,
1985. (See Amended Order Appointing Conservator, Approving Settlement of Minor's
Claim and Authorizing Conservator to Invest Proceeds and Execute Release, record
at 63 - 67)
14.

A lower court found that the aforementioned Twenty Thousand Dollars

($20,000.00) offered settlement was in full and final settlement of all claims and was
in addition to the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in medical benefits which
Farmers had already paid or would pay.

(See Amended Order Appointing

Conservator, Approving Settlement of Minor's Claim and Authorizing Conservator to
Invest Proceeds and Execute Release, record at 65)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This case is not a difficult case. Indeed the framework of surrounding issues
has been carved out by pre-existing case law.
The State simply is not able to afford itself the reimbursement relief provided
for in U.C.A., Section 26-19-7(2). The facts clearly show that the Estate of Aundrae
Higley did nothing to trigger the State's cause of action in this case. Farmers settled

3

Indeed the actual Petition was drafted by the attorneys for Farmers.
record, at 2)
4

(See

with the Estate of Aundrae Higley prior to the State providing or becoming obligated
to provide medical assistance. More importantly, in light of this Courf s disposition
to perhaps apply the existing medicaid statute retroactively, no part of the Twenty
Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) received by Aundrae was a recovery of "medical costs".
ARGUMENT
I.

Medicaid Has No Statutory Right To Recover From
Aundrae Higley.

The State's right to recover Medicaid payments made on behalf of Aundrae
Higley should be governed by Utah Code Annotated,4 Section 26-19-7, as that section
existed in 1985, when Aundrae's injury occurred, a settlement took place, and the
State provided certain Medicaid payments on his behalf. That section, at that time,
provided as follows:
A recipient may not file a claim or commence an action against a third
party for recovery of medical costs, for an injury, disease, or disability
for which the department has provided or has become obligated to
provide medical assistance without the department's written consent.5
Nonetheless it is conceded that in 1989, that section was amended.

The existing

language that prohibited the filing of a claim without the State's consent now
includes the settlement, compromise, release, or waiver of a claim as well.
section now reads as follows:
A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle,
compromise, release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery
of medical costs, for an injury, disease, or disability for which the

4

Hereinafter U.CA.

5

Emphasis added.
5

That

department has provided or has become obligated to provide medical
assistance without the department's written consent.6
It is inappropriate, however, to apply the current section retroactively.

And,

therefore, applying the only facts available to the lower court, it is clear that the
State's right to recover has not been triggered in this case.7 Neither Aundrae nor his
parents filed a claim or commenced an action against a third party for recovery.
Indeed, Farmers agreed to pay the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) to Aundrae
before the State provided or had become obligated to provide medical assistance and
that settlement was only formalized by way of court approval after that application
had been made.

Further, no part of the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00)

received by Aundrae was a recovery of "medical costs".
A.

U.GA. Section 26-19-7 Should Not Be Applied Retroactively.

This honorable Court has already concluded that the legislature merely
intended to clarify the statute with its 1989 amendments.8

However the Supreme

Court of this state has respectfully stated that the well established general rule is that
statutes not expressly retroactive should only be applied prospectively.9
There is of course a relatively narrow exception where a statute changes only
procedural law by providing a different mode or form of procedure for enforcing

6

Emphasis added.

7

It is only after a recipient proceeds in violation of the statute that the state's
right to recover is triggered. See U.C.A., Section 26-19-7(2).

8

See Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 779 P.2d 242, 246 n.2 (Utah App.
1989), hereinafter Camp.

9

In Re LP., 648 P. 2d 1364, 1369 n.4, (1982), and authorities cited.
6

substantive rights.10

Further the general rule has no application where the later

statute or amendment deals only with clarification or amplification as to how the law
should have been understood prior to its enactment.11
In the case at hand, the 1989 amendments to the Medicaid statute alter the
substantive law of that statute In the past the law was triggered only if a claim was
filed or an action commenced. Now, any settlement triggers the statute.
Because of the serious consequences the Medical Benefits Recovery Act has
on near indigent citizens of this state, its terms should be strictly construed and the
State should only be allowed to recover when it meets the burden of proving a
violation of the Act.12 Applying the statute as it existed at the crucial times of this
lawsuit, it is clear that the State's right to recover was never triggered.
B,

The Higleys Did Not File A Claim Or Commence An Action
Against Farmers.

The State's right to recover is triggered only if the recipient "file[s] a claim or
commence[s] an action against a third party." The undisputed facts show that the
Higleys did not file a claim or commence an action.

Rather, Farmers7 agents

approached the Higleys while Aundrae was still hospitalized, informed the Higleys
that they were paying the medical bills up to the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00)

10

In the Matter of the Disconnection of Certain Territory from Highland City, 668
P.2d 544, 549 (Utah 1983), citing Pilcher v. State Department of Social Services,
Utah, 663 P. 2d 450 (1983). See also State Department of Social Services v.
Higgs, Utah, 656 P. 2d 998 (1982).

11

In the Matter of the Disconnection of Certain territory from Highland City, 668
P. 2d 544, 548 (Utah 1983), citing Okland Construction Co., v. Industrial
Commission, Utah, 520 P.2d 208, 210 - 11 (1974).

12

See Indiana v. Guardianship of McEntire, 471 N.E. 2d 6, 9 (Ind. App. 1984).
7

policy limits on medical, and would pay the policy's Twenty Thousand Dollars
($20,000.00) general limits to Aundrae. No claim was ever filed and no action was
ever commenced by the Higleys against a third party.
C

Farmers Agreed To Pay The Twenty Thousand Dollars
($20,000,00) To Aundrae Before Medicaid Had Paid Or Became
Obligated To Pay Medical Costs On Behalf Of Aundrae.

As shown by the letter from Farmers to the Higleys,13 Farmers had paid the
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) medical limits and agreed to pay the Twenty
Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) general limits to Aundrae sometime prior to May 31,
1985. Application for the State's assistance was not made until June 10, 1985, and
was not accepted by Medicaid until June 20, 1985.

Though Farmers' settlement

hadn't received court approval until later, it was nonetheless agreed to prior to any
request for the State's assistance.
Though it was touched on briefly in a footnote, Camp involved a fact scenario
wherein the recipient had filed a claim prior to seeking Medicaid assistance.
The State's right to recover is limited to cases where a claim is filed or an
action commenced against a third party after the State has paid, or become obligated
to pay, medical expenses.

This conclusion is mandated not only by the clear

language of the Act, but also by the dictates of common sense. Indeed, this Court
in Camp expressly held:
. . . [C]ourts are not free to disregard the plain meaning of statutory
language . . .. Nor may we interpret unambiguous language in the
statute itself so as to contradict its plain meaning.14

13

See record at 163 - 4. A copy of the same is attached hereto as Exhibit A and
incorporated herein for the Court's convenience.

14

Camp at 245.
8

Obviously, If the State has made no payments there is no reason to get consent.
There is nothing to consent to. Because Farmers agreed to pay Aundrae before the
State entered the picture, the Higleys cannot have been required to seek the State's
consent to Higley's receipt of the money.
D.

The Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000,00) Received By Aundrae
Higley Was Not A Recovery Of "Medical Costs."

Farmers paid the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) medical cost limits of the
policy directly to medical care providers.15 The Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00)
paid by Farmers to Aundrae was to compensate him for the physical and emotional
injuries he suffered as a result of the accident.16 That evidence was uncontradicted
in the lower court proceedings.
Indeed at the lower court level portions of the Affidavit of Dennis J. Higley
were read into the record. The court asked specifically if there had been a motion
to strike the affidavit to which the State responded that there had not.17 Ergo, the
only evidence in the record shows clearly that the settlement was to compensate
Aundrae for the physical and emotional injuries he suffered.
This further illustrates the lower court's error in finding to the contrary that
the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) recovery included reimbursement for

15

See Exhibit A.

16

See record at 108 - 131. A copy of the Affidavit of Dennis J. Higley is
attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein for the Court's
convenience.

17

See record at 256 - ?. A copy of the germane portion of that transcript is
attached hereto as Exhibit C and incorporated herein for the Court's
convenience.
9

medical expenses in addition to the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in no-fault
medical benefits.

The only evidence before the lower court was Mr. Higley's

aforementioned Affidavit.
The State attempted to dispute that fact by noting that the release documents
prepared by Farmers7 lawyers released all of Aundrae's claims including claims for
medical costs. That cannot be surprising, however, given the fact that Farmers had
paid or was going to pay the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) policy limits on
medical costs. Further, in the Amended Order Appointing Conservator, Approving
Settlement of Minor's Claim, and Authorizing Conservator to Invest Proceeds and
Execute Release18 it was determined as follows:
Robert Mott, Rita Mott and Curtis Okerland, Jr., through their insurance
carrier, Farmers Insurance Exchange, have offered the sum of $20,000.00
in full atnd final settlement of all claims which Dennis J. Higley or
Aundrae Higley may have as a result of the accident specified herein.
This amount is in addition to $5,000.00 in medical benefits which
Farmers Insurance Exchange has already paid or will pay to or on behalf
of Aundrae Higley.19
There really is no dispute that only the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) was
paid by Farmers as "medical costs". That amount was not paid to the Higleys but
directly to the medical care providers, reducing the amount ultimately paid by
Medicaid.
The fact that no part of the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) settlement
was reimbursement for "medical costs" is the one issue that wasn't resolved in Camp.

18

See record at 63 - 67.

19

Emphasis added.
10

In Camp this Court stated that an insurance adjuster had submitted an affidavit
which contained a statement that the settlement was for all legally recoverable
damages, including medical expenses.20
In the case at hand since it is undisputed that the Twenty Thousand Dollars
($20,000.00) received by Aundrae was in addition to the amount paid by Farmers for
medical costs, the State is not entitled to any portion of that.
E.

Even Under Scrutiny Of U.GA. Section 26-19-7 As It Now
Reads, The Statute Simply Has Not Been Triggered.

While in the hospital Aundrae's father, Dennis Higley, was approached
by representatives of Farmers who informed him that the Five Thousand Dollars
($5,000.00) in medical benefits coverage would be paid to the medical care providers
and that Farmers had decided to pay the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00)
policy limit to Aundrae to partially compensate him for the physical and emotional
injuries he suffered as a result of the accident.

Farmers offered Mr. Higley the

aforementioned settlement on or before May 31, 1985.
Mr. Higley applied for Medicaid assistance on or about June 10, 1985.
Eligibility for Medicaid assistance was certified by the Department of Social Services
on or about June 20, 1985.
The Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) policy limits on medical benefits from
the Farmers was paid directly to the medical care providers.
Therefore, even under the present language of the statute, the actual settlement
was agreed upon before Mr. Higley sought assistance from the State.

Camp, at 246. Emphasis added.
11

CONCLUSION
The Higleys took no action that would trigger the State's right to recover any
portion of the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) settlement from Farmers. No
claim was filed, no action commenced, no settlement effected after Medicaid entered
the picture. More importantly, the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) recovery
was void of any medical costs component. The record is clear and uncontroverted
as to that.
This Court is therefore respectfully asked to reverse the lower court's decision
in granting the State's Motion for Summary Judgment and remand the case with
instructions to enter findings consistent with the evidence on record, i.e., the Twenty
Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) recovery was for pain and suffering and was in
addition to the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) paid for medical benefits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / £

day of ^ ^ u . r r -

, 19 ?o .

fetor Lawpence
'Attorney/for Aundrae Higley and
ite of Aundrae Higley
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EXHIBIT A

Blake S. Atkin #4466
BERMAN & O'RORKE
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 328-2200
Attorneys for the Estate of Aundrae Higley
and Aundrae Higley, a minor.
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS
J. HIGLEY

AUNDRAE HIGLEY,
A Minor.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Probate No. P-85-1091

)
: SS
)

Dennis J. Higley, having been first duly sworn,
deposes and says:
1.

Attached to this Affidavit is a true and correct

copy of a letter I received from Farmers Insurance Group on or
about the date it bears.
DATED thisy?/2/fS V dav of^February, 1989.

7i2*^_<t^J»

DENNIS"J. HIGJrfEY '
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this'^LaJ?. day of
February, 1989.

Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake
My Commission Expires:

THE

Farmers Insurance Group

OF COMPANIES

SALT LAKE CITY SOUTH BRANCH CLAIMS
P. O. BOX 7700

May 31, 1985

MURRAY, UTAH 84107-0700
Phone: 566-7131
Mr. & Mrs. Dennis Higley
1527 W. Claybourne Ave.,
West Valley City, Utah 84119

Re:

Our Insured:
Policy No:
Loss Date:
Claimant:

Robert Mott
76 10745 48 72
4-30-85
Aundrae Higley

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Higley,
Farmers Insurance Exchange offers policy limits to your son, Aundrae
Higley, for the accident of April 30, 1985.
We are in the process of paying $5,000 limits in medicals and offer
$20,000 to Aundrae as per our agreement.
Per our conversation at the hospital, I am sending the file to our
Attorneys who will prepare the Court Approval Settlement. They will
be in touch with you shortly.
If you have any questions, please contact me.
Very truly yours,
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE

V?9^
MARINA PERKINS
Claims Representative
MP:ej

EXHIBIT B

RLEDBISTHSGTC89RT
Third Judicial District

B l a k e S . At k i n #44 f- h
BERMAN & O'RORKE
50 South Main Street/ Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 328-2200

JAN 1 9 1989
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By,
Doputy ClerT

Attorneys for the Estate of Aundrae Higley
and Aundrae Higley, a minor.
UNI "I'l IF

HI IWi DISTRICT COURT IN \NI) FOU SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH.

IN T H E M A T T E R O F T H E E S T A T E O F :
AUNDRAE HIGLEY,
A Minor.

State of Utah

)

Count y o f S.m It Lake

)

Dennis J

J)
\
]

AFFIDAVIT OF
DENNIS J. H I G L E Y

]>

Probate N o . P-85-1091

H i g l e y , having b e e n first d u l y sworn,

d e p o s e s and s a y s :
1.

I h a v e p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e of t h e m a t t e r s set

forth herein.
2.

M y w j f H S h i r 1. e y

Ll

11•' H i »"| I '•j y

\' 111 I < »' I h '• p d i e n t s

and g u a r d i a n s of A u n d r a e H i g l e y .
3.

A u n d r a e w a s b o r n o n Septembp

4.

A u n d r a e , S h i r l e y and'I are residents of Salt L a k e

C o u n t y , Sta:e of U t a h .
i I 11
Waswhef-t ine
f

,.-;

i »11'i' 11, i "n«

W»>11 I f' 1 <i y t1<)u r r1i»rt/ e 11 u e ,

ill, A u n d r a e H i g l e y w a s s e r i o u s l y injured

parked c a r m w h i r h he had been sitting p u l l e a jway
inli Mill

f spppti M j u s i m j A u n d r a e fo S

\

and s t r i k e h i s head on t h e pavement.
6.

The d r i v e r of t; he c a r was Cu r t i s Oker 1 and,

7.

"'""in ! i ",i "ikei l a n d ,

Ji

'kru:!w t h a i

AIJIHJ

n.ie

Ji.

was

sitting o n t h e c a r w h e n Okerland accelerated.
3

T h e c a r being d r i v e n b y Curtis OkerMnri

li , VJ.-IS,

owned b y Robert M o t t , Rita M o t t and Curtis Okerland, Ji and
w a s insured b y F a r m e r s Insurance G r o u p .
9.

As I'l result:

I I he iiccii'leiil , A11rn 11 rie underwHiil

e x t e n s i v e m e d i c a l treatment, t h e cost of w h i c h exceeded
$65,00(

A u n d r a e twice underwent brain s u r g e r y and intensive

oindrae's treating p h y s i c i a n
Walker, neu

- .*

According

-

-

•

i Dr, M a r i o n L.
s Medical <'*••*r11

W a l k e r , t h e prognosis roi A u n d r a e is thai he

w i l l have d i f f i c u l t y w i t h c o o r d i n a t i o n and fine motor control
.••--.
left leg.

:lv on. hi s ] eft hand

1 eft arm,, and

A u n d r a e h a s permanent br ai i i d a m a g e and ^r - minimum

A u n d r a e h a s Mistainnd H " I'ercent d i •: ab L 1 I ty t\ , d re^ul*

I

the injuries sustained in t h e acident w i t h Curtis O k e r l u n d ,
Jr.

A copy of D r . Walker•s. e v a l u a t i o n is attached as Exhibit

1,1.

A t the time of the accident t h e car d r i v e n b y

C u r t i s O k e r l a n d , . J. . w a s ins,
Exchange.

z

iinei :> ins

T h e policy of liability insurance provided limits of

c o v e r a g e of $20,000 for :i njuries to o n e person per o c c u r r e n c e
ai id a $5 , 00 0 • ::o verage lii nit • :>i I medi ca] payments .

-2-

12.

While at Primary Children's Medical Center

visiting Aundrae, I was approached by representatives of
Fanners Insur din »• Exchange who intormed me that they had
insured Mr. Okerland's car, that that insurance policy was the
only asset nf the1" MnttT

in Mr

nke ?• I a rnrt -ininl Midi I h<-» $l , DfMl in

medical benefits coverage would be paid to Primary Children's
Medical Center and that Farmers Insurance Exchange had decided
f (J IH'T'I' Lin .I

„,

.

compensate him :

l i b ti.i M u n d r a e t o p a r t i a l l y

^ physical and emotional injuries he

suffered as a result of
13.

accident.

The $5,000 poll cy limits on. medical benefits from

the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy was paid to Primary
r li ] d r e 11 '"' i, M e cil :i c a 1 C e n t e i:..
14

Never at any time did Aundrae, Shirley Ann Higley

: I £i le a claim or commence an action against Farmers
si iranee E x c h a n g e .
15.

Shortly after Aundrae 1 s release from Primary

r:i ] dren' s Merino 1 f Hint HI

I I Ihjrney'i I ",|

IK-Jirmei \i hibin din t

Exchange filed in the Thi !" Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, * petition
iKservdlm

Ji|J|n

'. HI I

p r o c e e d s and e x e c u t e
16.
counsel

fI

-- . .*rir-trr

J

r appointment of
authority to

invest

release.

A u n d r a e , S h i r l e v rmr i ^ M I > I eprpspint" nd my

^ those proceedings.

transcript ut the hearing in

that ;:-dttei is attached as Exhibit "B".

-3-

Despite my requests for information, neither the
Court nor counsel for Farmers Insurance Exchange told me that
the state would

iiMkfj H r 1 HI I in

in t.' - " "ll

" " fjiust

1 u ir i < J u n l e s s

they were first notified and consented -: the settlement.
DATED this /fi~fa

dav of ^nuarv

1989

J . HIGL£?

.re me t h i s

Subscribed and sworn
January, 1989.

C
R e s i d i n g in
Expires:

> * P£*
KM

WENDY KING
i<P

W3o.IWn,3u*»12M
UTM144

s or

_4_

S?

~*^
day u£
^

/ J?if/

My JZoxtimission

7

Ad As (22*f CCrztJ-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this

\%

day of January , 1989,, 1 hereby certify

thdl I (.Mused I ii he in a i led - postage, prepai J. d l.iue and correct
copy ot the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J. HIGLEY to the
following:
Douglas Springmeyer
Assistant Attorney General!
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Aundrae Higley
Dennis J. Higley
1527 West Claybourne Avenue
West Valley City# Utah 84119

3168b
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mm PRIMARY CHILDREN'S
MM MEDICAL CENTER

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

DIVISION OF PEDIATRIC NEUROSURGERY
320 Twelfth Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
(801)521-1209

Associate Professor of Surgery
Division of Neurosuraerv
Associate Professor of Pediatrics
Department of Pediatrics

MARION L WALKER, M.D.. F.A.C.S., F.A.A.P.
Chairman, Division of Pediatric Neurosurgery

May 15,1987

JESSE C. TRENTADUE
BERMAN & O'RORKE
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SUITE 1250
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84144
Re: Aundrae Higiey
158916
Dear Mr. Trentadue:
As you are aware, Aundrae Higiey is my patient. I first saw him on May 1, 1985 after he was
involved in an automobile accident. He had been injured the day prior to his arrival at the Primary
Children's Medical Center. He worsened during the night and was transferred to our facility
because of the development of a blood clot overlying the left posterior portion of his brain in the
epidural space. This blood clot was immediately beneath the bone and external to the dura which
is the covering over the brain. He had a skull fracture at that site also. This is undoubtedly the area
that he struck when he fell off of the car that he had been sitting on the day prior to his admission
to our hospital.
In addition to the extradural hematoma and the skull fracture, he sustained a bruise of the left
cerebellar hemisphere. Approximately three days following his surgery for the extradural
hematoma, this bruise began to bleed and he developed a large blood clot involving the
substance of the left cerebellar hemisphere. This required a second surgical procedure and
severely injured his brain. This greatly complicated his hospital course and resulted in the need
for prolonged rehabilitation as well as a lengthened hospital stay.
Aundrae Higiey is left with permanent brain damage as a result of these injuries. He will always
have difficulty with coordination and fine motor control on his left side. This will be most noticed in
his hand but will be present in his arm and leg on the left side. It will also affect his balance and
coordination when he is running or participating in athletic events or activities that require good
coordination and fine motor control.
Aundrae also has the risk of seizures. The development of seizures during the course of his
hospital stay is a result of the injury to his brain. Although he is currently not having seizures, that
risk exists for his future. His risk of having seizures is approximately 4 to 5 percent. If seizures
occur, he will require medication and occasional evaluation with EEG and/or other diagnostic
modalities.
I have great concern that Aundrae will develop a signifcant learning disability. The nature of his
injuries would predispose him to this disability. Only formal neuropsychological testing would be
able to document the extent of the problems that exist.

May 15,1987
Re: Aundrae Higley
Page 2
Because of the difficulties with coordination, balance and fine motor movements, and because of
the possibility of seizures and learning disabilities, Aundrae should have a disability of at least 25
percent of the whole man. It is possible that his disability is greater than this,
I hope this information is helpful to you. Please don't hesitate to contact me if you require further
information.
Sincerely yours,

Marion L Walker, M.D., F.A.C.S., F.A.A.P.
dm

IN THE THIRD J U D I C I A L
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STATE OF UTAH
*

A

k

In tinii mal t e r

Probate No P8 C -in<U

of the Estate of
Judge Timothy R. Hanson
AUNDRAE HIGLEY,
October 30, 1985
a minor.

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-enti t ,11 ed cat is * i
•^cxiutr

regularly for hearing before the Honorable Timothy

r. Hanson, - Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of
..i K. r

Dunty,

State of Utah on the 20th day of October, 1985, at
1:30 p.m., and that the following pi: oceedings we:-*

"nil

it

\SN -<V

Bunny Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP

: .

A P P E A R A N C E S

Aldrea C. Alcabes
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON
& CHIPMAN
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake.City, Utah 84101

For Farmers Insurance
Excuange:

*

1i
13
1*
15
1
1
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

k

*

P R O C E E D I N G S
October 30, 1985
1:30 p.m.
THE COURT:

The record will reflect the Court's in

session in the matter of the Estate of Auncirae H igle,, ,„ d
minor, Probate No. P85-1091.
Before the Court

s a petition '- * \: e

appointment

ettlement,
authority to invest proceeds, and execute releases
record should reflect that the

IU

you-

The

** •*.;.=.

And also the minor's parents, also the petitioner,

Dennis J. Higley
is tin "it' correct

And i assume you're Shirley Ann Higley;

?

MS. HIGLEY:
THE COURT:

Uh-huh (affirmative).
The record wri ] 3 • t:ef 1 e< : : t

acceptance of service of the petition, and consent t

i£

appointment of conservator, and waiver of notice
h a s l:ii"ep

: hearing

«e i "eiHi hi / I h»' C u m '' <nd e x e c u t e d :J> V -

Higley.

That ;.s your signature, is it not, on that document?
MS. HIGLEY:

^u

COURT:

21

Yes.
A I I right.

22 • just want to have Mr
23

I

MS, ALi!'ABES i

W e f 1 1 f i1e that

Di d you

Higley sworn?
11 n

.

hem

24 I sworn.
25
3

DENNIS J. AND SHIRLEY ANN HIGLEY,
called as witnesses, having been first duly sworn,
were examined and testified as follows:
THE COURT:

You may proceed.

MS. ALCABES:

Thank you, Your Honor.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. ALCABES:
Q

Mr. Higley, would you state your name and your

address for the record?
A

Dennis Higley, 1527 West Claybourne Avenue.

Q

Mr. Higley, are you the nature father of Aundrae

Higley?
A

Yes.

Q

How old is Aundrae?

A

He just turned 13.

Q

Is it true that on April 30th of 1985 Aundrae was

injured when he was sitting on a car that pulled away from
the curb, pulled away and he fell off the car; is that
correct?
A

Yeah.

Q

Was that car driven by either Robert Mott, Rita

Mott, or Curtis Okerland, Jr.?
A

It was owned by one of them.

Q

Owned or driven by one of them?

A

Yeah.

4

Q

As a result of that accident, is it correct that

Aundrae sustained injuries to his head and his brain?
A

Yes.

Q

And as a result of his injuries, has Aundrae

incurred medical bills that exceed $65,000?
A

Yeah.

They exceed that for sure.

Q

Is it true that—is Aundrae currently undergoing

medical care for his injuries?
A

He f s got therapy, and he's under medication too.

Q

So he sees a therapist regularly?

A

Twice a week now.

Q

Will Aundrae have some sort of permanent

disability as a result of the accident?
A

They said—well, they don't know how much.

A

percentage, but they donft know how much.
Q

What are some of the things that Aundrae is not

able to do now?
A

It's his coordination.

A lot of it has come back,

but he staggers, and when he's writing and stuff, his
balance—
MS. HIGLEY:
Q

He can't write very good.

(By Ms. Alcabes)

How long was Aundrae in the

hospital?
A

A little over two and a half months.

Q

Mr. Higley, have you reached some kind of a

5

settlement with Mott's insurance carrier?
A

Yeah.

Q

Is that settlement to pay you—to pay Aundrae

$20,000 in addition to the $5,000 in medical bills?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you know that that's the limits of the

insurance policy?
A

Yes.

Q

Have you satisfied yourself that the Motts don't

have any other property from which to satisfy a judgment?
A

Yeah.

Q

Do you understand that I'm not your attorney; that

I'm the attorney for Farmers Insurance Group, the Motts'
carrier?
A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

Do you understand that you have the right to talk

to an attorney before you enter into this settlement?
A

Yes.

Q

Have you talked to an attorney?

A

Yes.

Q

Who did you talk to?

A

There was one—I don't know what his name was, and

then another one was Robert DeBry.

I talked to him on the

phone, and checked in, and he told me that that was the
maximum the policy was worth.

6

Q

In light of what you know about the policy limits,

and the extent of the Motts1 assets, do you want to enter
into this settlement?
A

Well, as I say, they ainft got nothing.

think they will have anything more than they got.

I donft
He f s had

open-heart surgery and everything else, and they ain't got
no money.
Q

You1re talking about the people that are

responsible for Aundraefs injuries?
A

Yeah.

Anyway, as far as I know, they ainft got

nothing.
Q

So in light of what you know, do you want to enter

into this settlement?
A

I don't know what you mean.

Q

Do you want to take this $20,000?

A

Yeah.

Q

Do you understand that by taking this $20,000, and

entering into this settlement, that neither you nor your
wife, nor Aundrae will ever be able to sue the Motts, or
this stepson, Curtis Okerland, Jr.?
A

Right.

Q

Do you understand what you1re to do with.the money

you're given from the insurance company?
A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

What are you supposed to do with it?

7

A

It goes into an account for Aundrae.

When he's

18, he can draw that out*
Do you understand thatfs to be a federally-insured

Q
account?
A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

Do you desire that your wife serve as Aundraefs

successor/conservator in the event that something happens
to you, and you are no longer able to serve as his
conservator?
A

Yes.
MS. ALCABES:

May I ask Mrs. Higley some

questions?
Q

Mrs. Higley, do you desire to be appointed the

successor/conservator in the event that something happens
to your husband?
A

Yes.

Q

Is that because of the need for continuing medical

care for Aundrae, and the need for continuity?
A

Yes.
MS. ALCABES:
THE COURT:

Do you have any other questions?

Just a couple.

Who has been, and who

will be paying the medical bills in the future?
MR. HIGLEY:

Medicaid picked up the balance after

the $5,000 from the insurance company.

Medicaid picked up

the rest.
8

THE COURT:

Is there any arrangements as to who's

going to be paying medical bills in the future, assuming
there are some?
MR. HIGLEY:

Me, I guess.

MS. ALCABES:

I think you have a question for the

judge in relation to that.
THE COURT:
me, Mr. Higley?

Is there something you wanted to ask

I'll be more than happy to try and answer

it.
MR. HIGLEY:

What I was wondering, like this money

goes into a deal for him.

Medicaid can't come back and

take that money from him where the bill is against me?
THE COURT:

Probably not.

But it would depend

upon the particular statutory authority that Congress has
given whoever runs Medicaid, assuming it's the Department
of Health and Welfare, or whatever it's called.

That

involves federal statutes, and federal law, Mr. Higley, and
this Court doesn't deal with federal law—only state law.
I would advise you that generally insurance companies who
pay medical bills have an interest in proceeds that might
be received like this, but where the expenses far outweigh
any recovery, and obviously if there is liability.here, the
only reason you're taking this $20,000 is that's all there
is.

The claim would be worth substantially more if there

is liability.

9

MR. HIGLEY:

The bill is close to probably

$95,000.
THE COURT:

Frankly, I doubt that they are going

to come back and bother you.

But I can't guarantee it.

I

don't pretend to have any control over the federal
government.
MR. HIGLEY:

I don't know.

But I've heard where

it's actually his money, not mine, they can't make him pay
my debts.
THE COURT:

Should someone assert a claim against

the funds that you're going to be holding for your son as
conservator, it is his money.
money.

It's his.

That's true.

It's not your

If in fact that's the case, what you

need to do is contact an attorney so you can have your
rights explained to you.
MR. HIGLEY:

Nobody said anything about it.

Medicaid doesn't even know we are getting it, as far as I
know,
THE COURT:
claim.

I suspect that they'll never make any

If they do you'll need to contact an attorney.
MR. HIGLEY:

Another thing I was wondering, is

this tax free?
THE COURT:
MR. HIGLEY:
THE COURT:

As far as your son is concerned?
Yes.
As I understand the tax laws, I don't
10

pretend to be a tax lawyer—
MR. HIGLEY:

When he reaches 18, when he takes it

out—
THE COURT:

Personal injury judgments are

generally not taxable,
MR. HIGLEY:
THE COURT:
MS. HIGLEY:
THE COURT:
time.

What about the interest on it?
The interest is taxable.
Thank you.
That's my best guess at this point in

And I donft pretend to be a tax lawyer.

I've just

been in this business for a while, and have learned that.
So the tax laws change every five minutes, so who knows.
MR. HIGLEY:

He wouldn't have to pay no tax on the

interest until he drawed it out?
THE COURT:

He wouldn't have to pay yearly.

In

any event, you can talk to your accountant about that, or
Whoever does your taxes.
MS. HIGLEY:
THE COURT:

Who do you have do your taxes?

H & R Block.
They can answer that question.

not a tax expert by any matter or means.

Ifm

It's your son's

income, and it will be so small it will probably not be
taxable even if the thing is taxable.
is to talk to H & R Block.

All right.

But the thing to do
The Court finds

that the minor is in need of a conservator.

There are

funds that would become available to Aundrae as a result of

11

1

this injury.

2

damages far exceed the amount that•s being paid in this

While it appears that his injuries and

3

J matter, the Court also recognizes, and is satisfied that a

4

reasonable inquiry has been made by the parties into the

5

ability of the potential liable parties, that is the

6

insureds of Farmers Insurance Exchange in this matter is

7

that they would not be able to satisfy any judgment above

8

and beyond the policy limits in any event.

9

settlement is the maximum policy limits available.

10
1!

Court%s

This proposed
And the

satisfied.
Therefore, I f m going to appoint M r . Higley as

12

conservator to act without bond on the Estate of Aundrae

13

Higley with all the rights and responsibilities that run to

14

a conservator.

15

a federally-insured account not to be withdrawn absent

16

order of the Court.

17

question of the proof of medical bills as an authorization

18

to take funds from the account.

19

difficulty with that, but I want to make sure that all

20

other possibilities of payment on medical bills that might

21

be incurred in the future are exhausted before you can get

22

to these funds.

23

Aundrae is 18 that he has the corpus, or the $20,000 plus

24

the interest available to him, because he's probably going

25

to need it.

The funds will be required to be placed in

In Paragraph 14A, you address the

I really don't have any

In other words, it would be nice if when

12

1

So obviously, if bills come up that you can't

2

afford to pay, and there is no insurance, and there is no

3

p l a c e else to go except this, I understand that.

4

M e d i c a i d will pay as w e l l .

5

t h e r e f s an estate there, w e are not going to pay any more

6

until that's g o n e .

7

Court, and I have no problem with approving the petition in

8

t h e m a n n e r as suggested, but M r . Higley, I would suggest to

9

y o u and your w i f e to utilize all sources to pay the bills

to

before you get to Aundrae's money, because as he gets

ti

older, he's going to need it, particularly if he continues
I

12

to h a v e the problems that h e is now experiencing.

13
H
15
16

And

And Medicaid will say, well,

So in any event, it's the intent of the

And finally, I'll require some indication from the
institution that they understand the contents of the order.
MS. ALCABES:

Does the Court want to make any

changes in the order with regard to the intent that the

17 m o n e y be used?

Will the Court also approve M r s . Higley as

18 t h e successor/conservator?
19
20
21

THE COURT:

Yes.

That's approved as w e l l .

I

didn't mean to overlook M r s . Higley.
MR* HIGLEY:

Now, w e put this money in the bank.

22 W e can put it in a certificate or money market, or anything
23

24

that we get the best interest on?
THE COURT:

The best interest, so long as it's a

25 federally-insured account.
13

MR. HIGLEY:

It can be in a three or five-year,

then renewed?
THE COURT:

Best interest you can get in a

federally-insured bank under any plan, as long as it's
safe.

It has to be a safe investment.
The record will show I've reviewed the proposed

order, and it is in a satisfactory format, and I've
executed it.

There you go.

MS. ALCABES:

Thank you, Your Honor.
(The hearing is concluded at
this time.)
* * *
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

2 I STATE OF UTAH

)
)

3I

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

SS.

)

4

I, BUNNY CAROL NEUENSCHWANDER, do hereby certify:
5

That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License
6

N o . 1 5 2 , and one of t h e official court reporters of t h e
7

State of Utah; that on the 30th day of October, 1985, I
8

attended the within matter and reported in shorthand the
9

proceedings had thereat; that later I caused m y said
10

shorthand proceedings to b e transcribed into typewriting,
11

and t h e foregoing pages, numbered from 3 t o 1 4 , inclusive,
12

constitute a full, true and correct account of the same to
13

t h e best of my ability.
14

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this ^ ? j ^ N i a y of
15

March, 1 9 8 7 .
16
17
18
19 .

BUNNY C^ROL NEUENSCHWANDER,

CSR, RPR,

CP

21
22

23

24 I My Commission Expires:
25

December 5, 1987
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EXHIBIT C

1

MR. ATKIN:

2

JUDGE YOUNG:

1 HAVE COURTESY COPIES.
NO, 1 HAVE COPIES OF THEM IN

3

THE FILE IF YOU WANT TO REFER TO A SPECIFIC AFFIDAVIT

4

AND HAVE ME READ THE LANGUAGE.

5

MR. ATKIN:

6

JUDGE YOUNG:

7

MR. ATKIN:

IF I MIGHT APPROACH THE BENCH?
YOU MAY.
1 AM READING FROM PAGE 3 OF THE

8

AFFIDAVIT IN PARAGRAPH 12.

MR. HIGLEY STATES THAT "WHILE

9

AT PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER VISITING AUNDRAE,

10

I WAS APPROACHED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF FARMERS INSURANCE

11

EXCHANGE WHO INFORMED ME THAT THEY HAD INSURED MR. OKERLUND'S

12

CAR, THAT THAT INSURANCE POLICY WAS THE ONLY ASSET OF

13

THE MOTTS OR MR. OKERLUND AND THAT THE $5,000.00 IN MEDICAL

14

BENEFITS COVERAGE WOULD BE PAID TO PRIMARY CHILDREN'S

15

MEDICAL CENTER AND THAT FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE HAD

16

DECIDED TO PAY THE $20,000.00 POLICY LIMITS TO AUNDRAE

H

TO PARTIALLY COMPENSATE HIM FOR THE PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL

1*

INJURIES HE SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT."

19

MR. SPR1NGMEYER:

YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY INTERJECT.

20

I DON'T BELIEVE THIS IS A PROPER MATTER FOR THIS AFFIDAVIT.

21

IT IS CLEARLY IN THE NATURE OF HEARSAY AND IT'S NOT PERSONAL

22

KNOWLEDGE OF MR. HIGLEY.

23
24

25

JUDGE YOUNG:

HAS THERE BEEN, MR. SPRINGMEYER,

A MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT?
MR.

SPRINGMEYER:

THERE HAS NOT.

MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT
tion (4)(a).; added "and" to the end of Subsection (4Kb); added Subsection (4)(c); made punctuation changes throughout Subsection (4);
and added Subsection (5).
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,
1990, substituted "Human" for "Social" in Subsection (3).

26-19-2

Social Securii^ A c t — Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act is compiled as 42
U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. Sectfcn/1919 of Title XIX
is 42 U.S.C. § 1396r.
<V/>\V ;>

^
>

CHAPTER 19
MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT
Section
26-19-2.
26-19-5.

26-19-7.

Section
Definitions.
Recovery of medical assistance
from third party liable for payment — Lien — Notice — Action -r- Compromise or waiver
— Recipient's right to action
protected.
Action or claim by recipient —
Consent of department required

26-19-18.

— Department's right to intervene — Department's interests
protected — Attorney's fees and
costs.
Release of medical billing information by provider restricted —
Exception — Liability for violation.

26-19-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Medical assistance" means any funds expended by the state under
Chapter 18, Title 26, and under Titles XVIII and XIX of the Social Security Act.
(2) "Property" includes the homestead and all other property, personal
or real, in which the recipient has a legal interest.
(3) "Provider" means a person or entity receiving compensation from
any public medical assistance program for goods or services provided to a
recipient.
(4) "Recipient" means a person who has applied for or received medical
assistance from the state; his guardian, conservator, or other personal
representative, if he is a minor or incapacitated person; and his estate and
survivors if he is deceased.
(5) "Third party" means:
(a) an individual, institution, corporation, public or private
agency, trust, estate, insurance carrier, health maintenance organization, health service organization, preferred provider organization,
governmental program such as Medicare, CHAMPUS, and workers'
compensation, which may be liable to pay all or part of the medical
costs of injury, disease, or disability of a recipient; and
(b) a spouse or a parent who:
(i) may be liable to pay all or part of the medical costs of a
recipient under law or court or administrative order; or
(ii) has been ordered to maintain health, dental, or disability
insurance to cover medical expenses of a spouse or dependent
child by court or administrative order.
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History: C. 1953, 26-19-2, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 18; 1984, ch. 34, § 1; 1987,
ch. 181, § 4; 1989, ch. 163, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,1989, rewrote Subsection (5).

26-19-5. Recovery of medical assistance from third party
liable for payment — Lien — Notice — Action —
Compromise or waiver — Recipient's right to action protected.
(1) When the department provides or becomes obligated to provide medical
assistance to a recipient because of an injury, disease, or disability for which a
third party is liable, the department may recover the medical assistance directly from that third party. The department's claim to recover medical assistance provided as a result of such an injury, disease, or disability shall be a
lien against any proceeds payable to the recipient by that third party. This
lien has priority over all other claims to the proceeds, except claims for attorney's fees and costs authorized under Subsection 26-19-7(4).
(2) The department shall mail or deliver written notice of its lien to the
third party at its principal place of business or last known address. The notice
shall include the recipient's name, the approximate date of injury, a general
description of the type of injury and, if applicable, the general location where
the injury is alleged to have occurred.
(3) The department may commence an action on its lien in its own name
however, that lien is not enforceable as to a third party unless:
(a) the third party receives written notice of the department's lien before it settles with the recipient; or
(b) the department has evidence that the third party had knowledge
that the department provided or was obligated to provide medical assistance.
(4) The department may waive a claim against a third party in whole or in
part, or may compromise, settle, or-release a claim or lien.
(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an action by a
recipient or a dependent of a recipient for loss or damage not included in the
department's action.
History: C. 1953, 26-19-5, enacted by L.
1984, ch. 34, § 3; 1989, ch. 163, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted
''When" for "If' at the beginning of Subsection
(1) and added the second and third sentences of
that subsection; substituted "The department"
for "If the department has a claim for recovery
from a third party it" and "lien" for "claim" in
the first sentence of Subsection (2) and the lan-

guage beginning "the approximate date of injury" for "last known address, identification
number, diagnosis, date and type of service,
and an itemized list of charges" at the end of
the second sentence of that subsection; rewrote
Subsection (3); substituted "a claim or lien" for
"it" at the end of Subsection (4); and deleted
Subsection (6), which read "A third party need
not pay a claim for medical assistance more
than once."
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26-19-7. Action or claim by recipient — Consent of department required — Department's right to intervene
— Department's interests protected — Attorney's
fees and costs.
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle,
compromise, release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery of
medical costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which the department has provided or has become obligated to provide medical assistance
without the department's written consent.
(b) The department has an unconditional right to intervene in an action commenced by a recipient for recovery of medical costs connected
with the same injury, disease, or disability, for which it has provided or
has become obligated to provide medical assistance.
(2) If the recipient proceeds without the department's written consent as
required by Subsection (l)(a), the department is not bound by any decision,
judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered or made on the claim or in the
action. The department may recover in full from the recipient all medical
assistance which it has provided and retains its right to commence an independent action against the third party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3).
(3) The department's written consent, if given, shall state under what
terms the interests of the department may be represented in an action commenced by the recipient.
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery for
attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action
that is commenced with the department's written consent.
History: C. 1953, 26-19-7, enacted by L.
1984, ch. 34, § 5; 1989, ch. 163, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted
"commence an action, or settle, compromise,
release, or waive a claim" for "or commence an
action" near the beginning of Subsection (l)(a);^
divided Subsection (2) into two sentences by

deleting "and"; substituted "retains" for "shall
maintain" in the present second sentence of
Subsection (2); and substituted the language
beginning "a proportionate share" for "its proportionate share of the cost of any action commenced in compliance with this section" at the
end of Subsection (4).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

State consent.

award of attorney fees to some Medicaid recipients, the fees must be in connection with the
commencement of an action, and the action
must be commenced with the state's written
consent. Camp v. Office of Recovery Servs., 779
P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

—Costs and attorney fees.
The commencement of an action without
state consent would rule out a state contribution for costs and attorney fees. Camp v. Office
of Recovery Servs., 779 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
Although Subsection (4) may authorize an

—Proceeding against third party.
The state is entitled to full, rather than equitable, reimbursement from a recipient for all
its Medicaid expenditures when the recipient
proceeds against a third party without the
state's consent. Camp v. Office of Recovery
Servs., 779 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

ANALYSIS

State consent.
—Costs and attorney fees.
—Proceeding against third party.
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26-19-18. Release of medical billing information by provider restricted — Exception — Liability for violation.
Except as provided in Section 26-21-20, a provider may not release medical
billing information to the recipient or the recipient's representative, or to a
third party without written authority from the department. A provider who
violates this section is liable to the department for any loss caused as a result
of the unauthorized disclosure.
History: C. 1953, 26-19-18, enacted by L.
1984, ch. 34, § 10; 1989, ch. 196, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-

ment, effective April 1,1990, added "Except as
provided in Section 26-21-20."

CHAPTER 21
HEALTH CARE FACILITY LICENSURE
AND INSPECTION ACT
Section
26-21-1.
26-21-2.
26-21-2.1.
26-21-3.
26-21-5.
26-21-6.
26-21-7.
26-21-8.

26-21-9.
26-21-10.
26-21-11.

Short title.
Definitions.
Services.
Health Facility Committee —
Members — Terms — Organization — Meetings.
Powers and responsibilities of
committee.
Powers and responsibilities of department.
Exempt facilities.
License required — Not assignable or transferable — Posting
— Expiration and renewal —
Time for compliance by operating facilities.
Application for license — Information required — Public
records.
Violations — Committee review.
Violations — Denial, suspension,
or revocation of license — Restricting or prohibiting new admissions —^Monitor.

Section
26-21-12.

Issuance of new license after revocation — Suspension of license
— Restoration.
License issued to facility in com26-21-13.
pliance or substantial compliance with chapter and rules.
26-21-13.5. Intermediate care facilities for
the mentally retarded — Licensing.
Closing facility — Appeal.
26-21-14.
Action by department for injunc26-21-15.
tion.
Operating facility in violation of
26-21-16.
chapter or rules a misdemeanor.
Department agency of state to
26-21-17.
contract for certification of facilities under Social Security
Act.
26-21-18.
Repealed.
26-21-20.
Requirement for hospitals to provide statements of itemized
charges to patients.

26-21-1. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Health Care Facility Licensure and Inspection Act."
History: C. 1953, 26-21-1, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 20; 1990, ch. 114, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,1990, rewrote this sec-

tion, which had read 'This chapter shall be
known and may be cited as the 'Health Facility
Licensure and Inspection Act.'"
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By.

R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312
Attorney General
DOUGLAS W. SPRINGMEYER #3067
Assistant Attorney General
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor
P.O. Box 45011
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: 538-4347

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF
HIGLEY, AUNDRAE
a minor.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDC
OF STATE OF UTAH
Case No, 853901091
JUDGE YOUNG

The motion of the State of Utah for summary judgment
and the motion of the estate for summary judgment pursuant to
Rule 56 of the U.R.C.P. having been filed and after a hearing on
the motion and the Court having previously entered a written
statement on the grounds for its decision as required by Rule
52(a) U.R.C.P. and good cause appearing for the granting of the
motion, and being fully advised in the premises,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion for summary
judgment of the estate be denied and that of the State of Utah be
granted and the State of Utah, have judgment against the estate
for the total sum being held on behalf of the minor pursuant to
the previous order in this matter dated November 22, 1985, which
is $20,000 plus accrued interest*
\THE COURT:

)avid S.
District^Couft Judge
Date :

^A&IUJUL^

/P • / 9

9()

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Order and Memorandum Decision postage prepaid to
the following:
Mr. Blake S. Atkin
Berman & O'Rorke
50 South Main, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
DATED this

3£***

day of January, 1990.
^a*~y^L4A

'2\Jy

oUa^\^A^>^f/6^

^..,1. !V»

FE3 8 1333
By.
..swat} C.wrt:

R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312
Attorney General
DOUGLAS W. SPRINGMEYER #3067
Assistant Attorney General
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor
P.O. Box 45011
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: 538-4347
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF
HIGLEY, AUNDRAE
a minor.

)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
PURSUANT TO RULE 52 (a)

)

JUDGE YOUNG

Case No. 853901091

The motion of the State of Utah and the Estate for
summary judgment

pursuant to Rule 56 of the U.R.C.P. having been

filed and after a hearing on the motion the Court hereby enters a
written statement on the grounds for its decision as required by
Rule 52(a) U . R . C . P .
1)

Recipient violated the statutory requirement that

"a recipient may not file a claim or commence an action against
the third party for recovery of medical costs for which the
department has provided medical assistance without the
department's written consent."

(§ 26-19-7(1)).

Accordingly,

"the department may recover in full from the recipient all
medical assistance which it has provided . . . "

(§ 26-19-2(2));

2)

The estate previously recovered $20,000 from Robert

J, Mott, which recovery included reimbursement for medical
expenses in addition to $5,000 in no-fault medical benefits.
2)

The State expended over $50,000 in medicaid

payments on behalf of Aundrae Higley for injuries related to the
accident involving Robert J. Mott and is therefore entitled to
full recovery to the extent of the recovery by the estate from
Robert J. Mott, the proceeds of which are being held pursuant to
the order of this court dated November 22, 1985, which amount is
$20,000 plus accrued interest.
3Y $BE COURT:

DaVid S.
D i s t r i c t Cqfurt
Date

: f^tMt^ £}/?$&

